Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'The Theory of Knowledge'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
23476 Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
23477 We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18273 Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22315 There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]