17 ideas
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |