Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'Events'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

17 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]