75 ideas
13560 | A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca] |
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
13559 | I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca] |
13561 | Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca] |
13562 | It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca] |
13564 | There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca] |
13563 | Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca] |
13565 | If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca] |
13557 | Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |