Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 5: Abstraction' and 'Tarski's Theory of Truth'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
23651 Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
23650 Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
23652 We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
23648 First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]