14 ideas
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
| 14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
| 9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
| 9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |