Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'What is an Emotion?' and 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
12149 Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23981 Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
12151 If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
18412 Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
12150 Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15203 Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
15204 Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]