17 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |