Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics: an introduction', 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong' and 'The Sublime and the Good'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
18859 Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18861 Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18866 Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18860 A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18863 What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
18865 Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18862 Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
22709 We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
22715 Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
22714 Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch]
22712 Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22713 Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch]