12 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |