56 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
9284 | Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |