Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics: the logical approach', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Manuscript remains'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]