Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics: the logical approach', 'The Concept of Dread (/Anxiety)' and 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding'

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116 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume]
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume]
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume]
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume]
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume]
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume]
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume]
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume]
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume]
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume]
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume]
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume]
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume]
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume]
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume]
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume]
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume]
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume]
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume]
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume]
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume]