28 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
7081 | Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath] |
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |