35 ideas
| 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
| 20320 | Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers] |
| 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
| 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
| 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
| 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
| 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
| 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
| 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
| 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
| 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
| 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
| 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
| 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
| 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
| 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
| 20323 | Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers] |
| 20322 | I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers] |
| 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
| 20324 | My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers] |
| 22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
| 22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
| 22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
| 22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
| 22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
| 22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
| 22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
| 20318 | My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers] |
| 20321 | The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers] |
| 20325 | Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers] |
| 20317 | Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers] |
| 20319 | We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers] |
| 20315 | 'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers] |
| 20316 | Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers] |