48 ideas
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
1507 | We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
5109 | The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle] |
1512 | Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
1508 | Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
454 | If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea] |
455 | That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea] |
1511 | If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius] |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |