9 ideas
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
16209 | How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |