17 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
16236 | Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley] |
6669 | For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe] |
4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |