133 ideas
13439 | Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock] |
13421 | 'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
13422 | 'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
13355 | 'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock] |
13350 | 'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock] |
13351 | 'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock] |
13356 | The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock] |
13352 | 'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock] |
13353 | 'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock] |
13354 | 'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock] |
13610 | A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock] |
13846 | A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock] |
13346 | Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock] |
13545 | Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock] |
13822 | Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock] |
13623 | The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock] |
13347 | Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock] |
13348 | It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock] |
13349 | Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock] |
13614 | MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock] |
13617 | MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock] |
13799 | The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock] |
13800 | |= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock] |
13803 | If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock] |
13357 | Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock] |
13812 | A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock] |
13811 | A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock] |
13360 | In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock] |
3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
13813 | Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock] |
13814 | Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock] |
13816 | Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock] |
13817 | Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock] |
13848 | We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock] |
13815 | Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock] |
13438 | 'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock] |
13818 | If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock] |
13801 | An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock] |
13619 | Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock] |
13622 | Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock] |
13615 | 'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock] |
13616 | The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock] |
13620 | Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock] |
13621 | The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock] |
13753 | Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock] |
13755 | Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock] |
13758 | In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock] |
13754 | Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock] |
13611 | Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock] |
13613 | A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock] |
13612 | Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock] |
13761 | In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock] |
13757 | Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock] |
13756 | A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock] |
13762 | Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock] |
13759 | Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock] |
13760 | A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock] |
13364 | Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG] |
13821 | Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock] |
13362 | If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock] |
13541 | For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock] |
13542 | A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock] |
13540 | A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock] |
13544 | Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock] |
13618 | Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock] |
13358 | Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock] |
13359 | Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock] |
3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
13802 | Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock] |
13543 | A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock] |
16209 | How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson] |
13847 | If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock] |
3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
13820 | The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock] |
3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
13363 | A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock] |
3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |