40 ideas
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |