Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Defense of Abortion', 'Externalism' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]
The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]