Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Machine Man', 'Principia Ethica' and 'Real Essence'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
16030 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
7647 The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
7645 When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
23225 The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7652 Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
7650 All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7651 With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
7648 The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
7646 There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
7649 There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]