Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Critique of the Gotha Program', 'Universals' and 'Identity and Necessity'

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37 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx]
Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx]
From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]