13 ideas
| 19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
| 19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |