Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language' and 'Eudemian Ethics'

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58 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]