Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery', 'Negation' and 'Sentences'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau]