Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Conditionals' and 'The Nature of Mathematics'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
14784 Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]