11 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |