19 ideas
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |