11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 17807 | To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry] |
| 17806 | It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry] |
| 17808 | Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |