45 ideas
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |