12 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |