14 ideas
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |