Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'Essence and Modality'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]