20 ideas
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |
18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |