11 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |