19 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 9103 | A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
| 7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
| 16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
| 6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
| 6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
| 3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
| 7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
| 3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
| 9104 | A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |