Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence', 'Natural Theology' and 'Formal and Material Consequence'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
14187 If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
14188 Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
14182 If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
14183 Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
14184 In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14186 Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14185 Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
21275 Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley]
21276 From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley]
21277 Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley]
21278 All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley]
21357 No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley]