40 ideas
| 23755 | Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil] |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| 23747 | What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| 23756 | The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil] |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
| 23758 | Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil] |
| 23760 | All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil] |
| 23748 | The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil] |
| 23759 | Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil] |
| 23762 | Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil] |
| 23750 | It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil] |
| 23749 | The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil] |
| 23753 | People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil] |
| 23751 | Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil] |
| 23752 | Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil] |
| 23757 | The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil] |
| 23761 | Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil] |
| 23764 | The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil] |
| 23763 | Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil] |
| 23754 | The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil] |