49 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |