38 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
| 10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
| 10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
| 10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
| 10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
| 10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
| 10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
| 10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
| 10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
| 10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
| 10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
| 10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
| 10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
| 10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
| 10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
| 10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
| 10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |