46 ideas
| 2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
| 21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
| 2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
| 18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
| 13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
| 16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
| 16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
| 12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
| 13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
| 16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
| 16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
| 13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
| 13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
| 16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
| 18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
| 17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
| 13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
| 13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
| 13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
| 13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
| 13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
| 16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
| 13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
| 13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |