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All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Treatise of Human Nature' and 'Parts of Classes'

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97 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume]
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume]
There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume]