Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Models' and 'Propositions'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]