17 ideas
| 2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
| 2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
| 13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
| 13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
| 13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
| 9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
| 9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
| 9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
| 9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |