Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]