11 ideas
2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |