37 ideas
| 2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
| 2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
| 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
| 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
| 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
| 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
| 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |