32 ideas
| 2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
| 2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
| 23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
| 23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
| 23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
| 23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
| 23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
| 23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
| 23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |
| 23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
| 23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
| 23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
| 23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
| 23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
| 23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
| 23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
| 23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
| 23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
| 23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
| 23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
| 23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
| 23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
| 23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
| 23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
| 23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
| 23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
| 23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
| 23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
| 23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
| 23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
| 23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
| 23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |