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All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Vagueness' and 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus'

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76 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]
Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson]
You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson]
Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson]
Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson]
Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson]
Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson]
Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson]
Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson]
The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza]
Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza]
Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza]
If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza]
Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza]
People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza]
Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza]
In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza]
No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza]
Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza]
The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza]