14 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |