37 ideas
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| 13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
| 13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
| 13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
| 13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
| 13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
| 13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
| 13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
| 13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
| 13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
| 13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
| 13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |